Localities in developed countries often enact regulations to restrict supply and raise the price of housing, deterring low-income households from moving in. In developing countries, formal sector supply restrictions lead to informal housing sectors not governed by these restrictions. To deter low-income migrants, localities in developing countries withhold public services to the informal sector, where low-income migrants live, creating a disincentive for them to enter. Using a sample of 327 Brazilian localities, we examine migration and exclusion, focusing on the public provision of water to small houses in which migrants are likely to live. Withholding water connections reduces the growth rate of low-education households, but, because of negative externalities, it also reduces the growth rate of high-education households. In terms of service provision, while richer localities provide more servicing (a wealth e¤ect) and larger localities provide more servicing (a scale e¤ect), being both rich and large is associated with reduced servicing. Localities respond strategically to service provision in other localities of the urban area. If some localities increase their servicing, attracting more migrants to the urban area, another locality may respond by withholding service in order to de ‡ect incoming migrants away from itself.
Introduction
In developing countries during periods of rapid urbanization, urban areas often house signi…cant portions of their populations in slums or informal housing sectors. For Brazil this is illustrated by the growth of its now infamous favelas, as well as loteamentos, since the 1960s. Today, these types of settlements are a growing phenomenon in South and SouthEast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the "urban villages" of Beijing and other Chinese urban areas. Informal housing sectors are usually characterized by low housing quality and varying degrees of insecurity of tenure. Perhaps more critically, they tend to be cut o¤ from basic urban services, such as piped water from the local water authority, which makes living conditions expensive, unpleasant, and unhealthy.
Lack of servicing in the informal sector is not due to lack of demand for services on the part of residents. For example, water is essential and obtaining water privately is far more costly than the social user cost of public supply. While lack of servicing is sometimes characterized as a failure of governance, we hypothesize that such failure is often intentional. In other words, there is a strategic element to not servicing informal housing sectors. Perpetuating bad living conditions for migrants is a way for existing residents to discourage in-migration to a locality. In China today, for example, this strategic component is explicitly articulated in policy design (Cai 2006) . Forcing the vast majority of migrants into poorly serviced informal sector settlements is intended to restrain rural in-migration to China's urban areas, especially the largest ones. While explicit articulation of exclusionary motivations for withholding public services is less politically feasible in countries like Brazil, the data indicate that such policies were nevertheless adopted.
We study strategic withholding of servicing and its e¤ect on migration to Brazilian urban jurisdictions from 1980 to 2000. While Brazil's rural to urban migration today has diminished, local resistance to in-migration was an important issue in the 1980s. In Brazil, localities within urban areas make policy decisions that in ‡uence in-migration to their speci…c localities-potentially providing an element of a "race to the bottom"within urban areas in terms of servicing migrants. We examine (a) the impact of withholding public water services to migrants on a locality's subsequent population growth and social composition, and (b) what determines a locality's underprovision of services to migrants. By studying Brazil's historical experience with urbanization and informal housing, we may better understand the forces at work in today's rapidly urbanizing countries.
An additional motivation for the study is that the development of unserviced informal housing sectors has e¤ects beyond restraining migration, such as inequality in living conditions and unhealthy neighborhoods with high negative externalities. The resulting negative externalities may also a¤ect the location decisions of those who live in nearby formal sector housing. An issue we do not study but that is relevant is that underservicing today requires later, and possibly costly, catch-up investments. Installing water and sewer infrastructure long after the development of dense neighborhoods can require extensive spatial reconstruction and recon…guration of neighborhoods.
There is an extensive literature on exclusionary policies of local jurisdictions in developed countries (e.g., the Tiebout literature, as reviewed in Epple & Nechyba 2004) . The reasons for exclusion in developing countries have the related elements of limiting over-population and congestion, as well as strati…cation, with the rich wanting to separate from the poor; but there are key di¤erences between exclusion in developed and in developing countries. In developed countries, exclusion occurs through formal sector housing restrictions with the imposition of development fees, zoning, and other policy levers limiting housing development and population density. In many developing countries, however, formal sector housing restrictions, rather than halting locality growth, lead to the development of an informal sector where such restrictions are ignored. Unlike in most developed countries, the existence of an informal housing sector in developing countries is often tolerated. It is either not politically feasible to halt the development of informal settlements or weak institutions make it di¢ cult to enforce laws against informal settlements. Because formal sector restrictions are not enough to halt growth, policies to exclude rely on withholding service to informal housing sectors.
Brazil has two types of informal housing markets. First are favelas, which were his-torically created by invasions of government land or private land often under title dispute.
In principle, such settlements are illegal, both because land-use regulations are evaded and because the housing is on land owned by parties other than the occupier. Second are loteamentos, where developments do not meet zoning regulations, but are built on legally acquired land. After development, however, owners cannot obtain land title because the housing does not meet zoning regulations. Favelas are an early phenomenon, often pictured in cities such as Rio de Janeiro as a response to in-migration pressure and lack of formal sector housing. Development of loteamentos was supposedly spurred by a national law in 1979 requiring 125 square meters of land as the minimum lot size for any construction (Avila 2006) . Since only 15% of urban housing units in Brazil are apartments, the law was aimed at single family homes. A common view is that the law made formal sector housing una¤ordable for many low-and low-middle income families at that time.
Until the late 1980s and democratization, it was in principle "illegal" for localities to provide public infrastructure such as central water connections in favelas and loteamentos, although some localities still did so. In other localities, the fact that favelas and loteamentos were illegal settlements provided an opportunistic excuse to deny or limit service provision. While localities cannot stop the construction of informal housing, they can contain the demand for it by withholding basic public infrastructure from informal neighborhoods, so as to o¤er poor living conditions and the need to substitute expensive private alternatives for services that could be provided cheaply by the public sector.
Strategic underservicing informal neighborhoods on the part of localities may also arise because of discordant local and national government incentives. In developing countries, certain localities may be favored by policy initiatives of national governments, such as capital market allocations for industry, licensing for export, foreign direct investment, imports, and government investment in state capitalism. This political and economic agenda of the national government to favor certain localities has the side-e¤ect of attracting migrants seeking job opportunities to these localities. If in-migration is unfettered, such favored localities ultimately become "over-populated," with migration only slowing when the increased congestion, living costs, and diminished quality of life from over-population lead to dissipation of the bene…ts of national government favoritism. The literature makes this point generally (Ades & Glaeser 1995 , Davis & Henderson 2003 and then with examples from Indonesia and China (Henderson & Kuncoro 1996 , Je¤erson & Singhe 1999 , Au & Henderson 2006 as well as Brazil.
In most developed countries, natural amenities rather than national government favoritism are the driving force of increased migration pressure to certain localities. In a recent paper, Gyourko et al. (2006) examine di¤erences in natural amenities across Amer-ican cities, making some key points. Certain "superstar" cities are favored with excellent natural amenities demanded more intensively by higher income individuals. In such cities, the authors observe that population growth over time has slowed, the share of the population from higher income groups has grown, and there is "excess demand to enter the city" as evidenced by rapidly rising housing prices relative to the rest of the nation. The presumption is that superstar cities impose strict land-use regulations that inhibit further residential development which, if it occurred, would dissipate the natural advantages these cities o¤er. Higher income individuals are willing to pay higher housing prices associated with restrictions and better amenities, so that with national population growth, superstar cities become relatively richer. While national government favoritism may be more of an issue compared to natural amenity di¤erentials in many developing countries, we also observe that high income localities are both slower growing and increasingly richer in Brazil.
The primary focus of our discussion and later modeling concern localities'attempts to restrain in-migration as a way of avoiding over-population and dissipation of amenities. However, in the empirical section, we also examine the strati…cation of rich and poor households that may arise from localities'attempts to limit in-migration. We consider two ways that policies to exclude migrants may lead to strati…cation. First, exclusionary policies may disproportionately target low-skilled migrants, who generate greater negative externalities and …scal costs, with localities generally more willing to accept high-skilled migrants. Second, the localities most likely to implement exclusionary policies may be those that are richer and larger, and therefore have greater …scal reasons (not wanting to subsidize poorer residents) or personal aversion to allowing low-skilled migrants to enter. While our focus is primarily on exclusion, we also examine how exclusion may lead to strati…cation of households across localities.
Section 2 of the paper discusses data and trends toward exclusion in Brazil. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework to inform econometric speci…cations. Section 4 estimates the impact of strategic underservicing of migrant households on locality population growth and population composition. Section 5 analyzes whether localities in an urban area seem to interact strategically to exclude migrants and what types of localities are more likely to under-provide public infrastructure to migrant households. Section 6 concludes.
Urbanization and Public Infrastructure in Brazil
This section provides background information on Brazil relevant to our study. First we describe the data and spatial units of analysis. Then we provide an overview of Brazilian locality and urban area growth, which will help frame the precise approach and modeling we undertake. Finally, we examine data on di¤erent dimensions of housing sector informality and then turn to the issue of how, in the data, to represent policy initiatives that are based on exclusionary considerations.
The paper focuses on the post-1980 time period. We …rst examine the population response to public water service across localities, speci…cally how the 1990 level of public water provision to the houses in which low-skilled migrants would live a¤ects locality population growth and composition between 1990 and 2000. This timing turns out to be convenient in terms of an identi…cation strategy. The 1980s are the last phase of Brazil's period of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Industrial development, which had focused on Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the post World War II period, starts to decentralize in the late 1970s with substantial and on-going industrialization of hinterland cities. This decentralization is facilitated by inter-city investments in transportation and telecommunications, as well as agricultural developments in the Northeast of Brazil (Da Mata et al. 2005) . By the 1990s, these adjustments are largely complete. This change in urbanization and industrialization patterns re ‡ects a change in the underlying drivers of city growth from the 1970s to the 1990s. Using this change in the determinants of city growth as part of the identi…cation strategy in Section 4, we can isolate the e¤ect of public water provision on a locality's population growth and composition.
After establishing that public water provision a¤ects in-migration, we turn to the determinants of public water provision. We look at provision during the 1980s, which starts o¤ as non-democratic. Full democratization at the national level occurs in 1988, with democratic reforms in subsequent years.
1 One set of reforms removes restrictions on localities'provision of infrastructure services to the informal sector; another encourages the regularization of informal housing sectors and the upgrading of services. Our working assumption is that during the 1980s, exclusionary under-servicing of informal neighborhoods by localities was possible, even though most of our localities had elected mayors. Elitist dominated cities could legitimately deny services to the informal sector. However, by the 1990s and following national reforms, such strategic exclusionary behavior was less feasible politically, an issue we examine towards the end of the paper.
Data
We have Brazilian Population Census data for 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000 . These data contain a variety of information on housing size, tenure mode, and servicing of houses as well as basic socioeconomic information covering education, income, family structure, and migration. We also have information on geographic and …scal indicators. While we do not focus on land-use regulations, we do have retrospective information on regulations for each locality. A census of local governments conducted in 1999 and in 2005 indicates whether cities had passed a minimum lot-size zoning law in excess of the national standard of 125 square meters by 1999.
2
Local governments in Brazil are municipalities (municipios), units equivalent to counties in the United States. Because some municipalities split over time and some are annexed by other municipalities, we combine municipalities into "common denominator"ones, which we call localities or, more formally, Minimum Comparable Areas (MCAs).
3 These localities are constant spatial units during the time period we analyze. We focus on localities that are at least 50% urbanized by 1991 that are located in larger urban areas with multiple localities.
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We drop from the sample all localities that form their own isolated urban area since we are interested in strategic interactions among localities and since we wish to control for urban area …xed e¤ects. This leaves a sample of 327 localities in 54 urban areas. Of these 327 localities, 238 are composed of just one municipality and 89 have multiple municipalities. Of these 89, 45 have a dominant municipality with over 85% of the locality population. We will perform robustness checks where we drop the 44 localities with no dominant municipality or all 89 that have multiple municipalities, although doing so has no e¤ect on results. Additionally, since the urbanization rate of the 327 localities changes dramatically from 1970 to 2000, we often look at sub-samples of localities, imposing the restriction that they be at least 50% urbanized in a given census year in order to be considered as part of the urban area.
Patterns: Urban Growth and Strati…cation
In the spatial development of Brazil, urban areas experience mostly parallel growth from 1980-2000, with all but the two largest (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo) growing at about the same rate, as a number of theories predict (e.g., Black & Henderson 1999 , Gabaix 1999 and Figure 1a demonstrates. While the dispersion of growth rates is larger for smaller urban areas in Figure 1a , excluding Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, there is no "convergence" or relative mean reversion. Urban areas grow mostly in parallel, with knowledge accumulation and improved education levels being the main drivers of urban area growth (Da Mata et al. 2007 ). In contrast, in Figure 1b , localities within urban areas experience much stronger mean reversion: bigger localities grow at a slower rate than smaller ones. From Figure 1b , it is also evident that the larger, slower growing localities tend to be richer.
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With population growth in an urban area, old localities "…ll up" and become crowded, and new localities develop. With economic development, urban areas spread out, fueled by declining commuting costs and transportation improvements that make central city locations less valuable. This movement of migrants into di¤erent localities within urban areas is the variation we will utilize in the empirical work. In Brazil, as in much of the world, the rich live predominately in the center cities and the poor live in suburbs. Much of the exclusion we observe is therefore of over-crowded central cities and richer and larger suburbs de ‡ecting migrants into low-income, suburban localities within the urban area. 6 Finally, localities in Brazil also appear to subscribe to Gyourko et al.'s (2006) superstar city story, with rich localities becoming even richer over time. In Figure 2 , we plot the share of a locality's households that is among Brazil's richest 10% in 2000 against the share that is among the richest 10% in 1980. Here, we note that the largest 20% of all localities have almost universally increased their share of the rich, with their data points lying above the 45-degree line.
The Informal Sector and Public Infrastructure
An issue is how to identify who lives in the informal sector and how to de…ne that sector. We summarize some possibilities as discussed in the literature (Dowall 2006 , Biderman 2007 . In the census, there is a question …lled out by census takers on whether people live in "irregular settlements." Irregularity in this context captures whether streets are straight or crooked and whether houses are properly numbered in a neighborhood con…guration of housing, not whether houses are serviced or owners have formal title. Thus, irregularity di¤ers from informality, and less than 5% of households are considered irregular. Economists typically 5 Rich localities are de…ned as those that are in the top 20% of all urban localities sorted by median household income.
6 Why the di¤erence in where the rich live compared to the United States? One reason may be that, unlike in the United States, in most countries, funding for public education occurs at the state or national level. The rich by suburbanizing cannot form exclusionary "clubs" o¤ering independently funded, high-quality schooling; and thus they may prefer the center city with its lower commuting times to service-intensive central business districts. prefer to de…ne informality based on ownership rights. In the 1991 and 2000 Census, there is a question for home owners on whether they have title to their land. In 1991, about 9% of urban households living in owner-occupied houses in our localities do not report land title. Again the number seems small compared to estimates in the literature; the belief is that many households without true title answer yes to having title because they do not feel insecure about their holdings. Home ownership is easily transferable, even without formal land ownership, and eviction even from favelas is rare. As an example of the perception of security, in regularization programs to grant land title to those without it, a number of participants fail to take the last step (about one day of work) and register their land tenure once they are able to do so.
A di¤erent approach is to de…ne informality based on lack of public infrastructure provision. The literature (see Dowall 2006) suggests a key element is a central water connection, where in 1991, about 17% of urban households were not connected, on average, across our sample of localities. A stronger criterion is to impose "full service:"electricity (virtually universal in 1991), a central water connection, and a central sewer connection. In 1991, about 65% of households do not have full service, on average, across our sample of localities. There are several reasons we focus on water connections instead of full service. First, the literature argues that it is lack of water which is the key issue for residents (e.g., Scheper-Hughes 1993, Chapter 2). Second, provision of a central water connection appears to be more of a locality decision made by municipal water authorities or in negotiation with regional authorities, while sewer provision seems to be more of a state-level decision. Third, the history of spatial development in a city is a key element determining central sewer connections, but less so for water. While water connections to unserviced areas are relatively easy to add using above-ground water pipes, installing sewers require major investment and upheaval in terms of digging up streets and even house demolition. Many neighborhoods, even richer ones historically without sewer connections, continue to rely on private alternatives such as septic systems. In 1991, only 187 localities from our sample of 327 localities had more than 10% of houses with full service. For water, 326 of 327 localities provided a central water connection to at least 10% of houses. If no households in a locality have sewers, it is not an exclusionary tool.
For water, lack of a public connection means private alternatives must be used. In many localities, especially those situated on large water tables, the private alternative for richer households in the early years of urbanization was to dig wells, and some cities initially chose to have no central water provision. However, with sustained use and population growth, wells in many areas started to run dry for portions of the year, leading to the development of central water systems in almost all localities. For migrants, many cannot a¤ord to drill a well even if these had remained a viable alternative to public water provision. For those without a central water connection, the private alternatives at the margin are to use a public stand pipe and haul the water for some distance, extend hoses into nearby but often polluted rivers and pump the water to their homes, subscribe to water truck services (known as carros-pipa in Brazil), or purchase bottled or bagged water. These are di¢ cult, dirty, or expensive alternatives.
As a preliminary check that central water connections are highly valued, we examine willingness-to-pay for water connections, using simple hedonic regressions for renters in the central cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The next section describes how these hedonics …t into the overall conceptual and estimation framework. Hedonic regressions reveal willingness-to-pay within a locality for infrastructure connections, for those on the margin between choosing a serviced versus unserviced rental unit. The results are in Appendix A. The regressions are for 1980, the one census year in which relevant data on rents and neighborhood location within the two cities are available, so we can use neighborhood …xed e¤ects to control for neighborhood characteristics. We …nd the marginal consumer is willing to pay 12% more for a rental unit with a central water connection (net of any additional premium for indoor plumbing) in Sao Paulo and 23% in Rio de Janeiro. The regressions control for types of sewage provision and whether households have electricity.
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In this paper, we focus on the notion of exclusion through lack of servicing, but how does a policy of restricted servicing appear in the data? This is a complicated issue because in Brazil (unlike China) exclusionary policies cannot target individuals based on personal characteristics such as migrant status. They can only target houses and neighborhoods where migrants are likely to live, recognizing that migrants can live where they demand given incomes and prices. We start by looking at the evolution of servicing as a guide to how we will measure the extent of servicing that migrants are likely to face. Table 1 explores dimensions of water servicing. We look at localities that are at least 50% urbanized by 1991, as well as localities that are at least 50% urbanized versus those that are not in 1970, allowing us to track service expansion within constant samples of localities. Table 1 shows the rapid expansion in services in urban Brazil over the decades. 7 We also note that renters are willing to pay an additional 20% in Sao Paulo and 36% in Rio de Janeiro for a unit with central sewer and electricity, in addition to water. Isolating the components in Appendix A, there is a very high premium on electricity (although even in 1980 it is virtually universally available), but central sewer itself still commands a 9% and 18% premium in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, respectively, over no connection (with septic systems in those congested cities generating little premium over no sewerage at all).
Provision of Infrastructure Services
In 1970, localities that were at least 50% urbanized provided a connection to a central water system to 50% of their urban households. By 2000, this number had reached 89%, re ‡ecting growth along two margins-increased servicing within highly urbanized localities and the addition of localities that were previously less than 50% urbanized. The fact that the weighted 8 percentage of houses with a central water connection is higher than the unweighted percentage suggests that more populous localities service a greater share of their households. The second panel of Table 1 shows similar results for a constant sample of 185 localities that were at least 50% urbanized by 1970. Analyzing now only on one margin-of increasing service but not adding new localities to the sample-we see localities dramatically increase the share of houses they service, from a mean of 50% in 1970 to 92% by 2000. Finally, in the third panel, we explore the increase in servicing among today's urban localities that were under 50% urbanized in 1970. These newer localities also have rapid expansion, but are at lower service levels. The numbers suggest that localities can quite rapidly expand their central water systems, and the fact that some houses remain unserviced even by 1991 and 2000 might re ‡ect strategic elements.
The …rst panel of Table 1 also explores how services di¤er across types of households in 1991. In terms of tenure, not surprisingly, those who report that they do not own the land under their house are less serviced than those who report land title. Small houses, those with 1-3 total rooms, are less serviced than large houses, with 7-9 total rooms. While migrants are less serviced than non-migrants, we try to control for income e¤ects by looking at households in the bottom 20% of the national urban income distribution. Low-income migrants (who moved to the locality in the last 10 years) are less serviced than low-income non-migrants, although the di¤erences within low-income groups are not large. While localities care about the rate of in-migration, today's migrants are tomorrow's non-migrants. Localities may be concerned about the level and extent of poverty in their population, potentially welcoming higher-income migrants (who may displace existing lower-income migrants) and discouraging lower-income migrants from entering. In Section 4, we will look at both growth and population composition outcomes.
While we can cite numbers for servicing of migrants, as noted above, localities cannot discriminate on the basis of income nor migration status. What localities can do is not service the houses that most migrants and low-educated households are likely to occupy. We look at this in Table 2 . Before turning to the table, we note that migrants tend to live in the smallest houses, de…ned as those with 1-2 total rooms in 1970 and 1980 or 1-3 total rooms in 1991 and 2000. In contrast, we also look at households living in larger houses, those with 6-7 rooms in 1970 and 1980 and 7-9 rooms in 1991 and 2000 (groupings which exclude approximately the top 10% of houses by size in each decade). In the data, about 15% of households live in small houses and 20% live in these larger houses, with exact numbers footnoted in the table. In 1991, 33% of the migrants in our localities lived in small houses and only 12% lived in large houses, whereas 18% of non-migrants lived in small houses and another 18% lived in large houses. For migrants from rural areas, 42% lived in small houses and only 7% lived in large houses. Finally, for low-educated households (where the household head did not complete primary school), 27% lived in small houses and 13% lived in large houses, compared with 17% in small houses and 19% in large houses for higher-educated households (where the household head completed at least primary school). Targeting the smallest houses therefore appears to be an e¤ective mechanism in discriminating against migrants and low-educated households.
In Table 2 , we examine the service levels for small versus large houses. Table 2 gives locality averages for servicing of small versus large houses for the full sample of 327 localities, for the restricted sample of 185 localities that were at least 50% urbanized in 1970, and for the remaining 142 localities that were less than 50% urbanized in 1970. For the full sample of 327 localities, only 48% of small houses in 1980 had a public water connection, compared to 74% of large houses. By 2000, the gap diminishes but is still noticeable overall. Restricting the sample to only those localities that were more or less than 50% urbanized in 1970, we observe that the gap in servicing of small versus large houses is similar to what we found when looking at the full sample, but the absolute service levels of both small and large houses are higher for those localities that urbanized earlier and lower for those localities that urbanized later. In Sections 3 and 4, we will use the provision of a public water connections to small houses as our basic "exclusionary" measure, representing the quality of infrastructure that incoming migrants might expect when choosing to live in a particular locality.
Land-Use Regulations
As an interesting aside, we examine one aspect of local land-use regulations: lot-size zoning over and above the national 1979 minimum lot-size law. Most of these local regulations were passed after democratization in 1988, and our data are from 1999 and 2005. From our sample of 327 localities, 200 had passed a minimum lot-size zoning law in excess of 125 square meters by 1999-that is, a minimum lot-size zoning law in excess of the national standard. Comparing these localities, when we look at homeowners without title to land relative to those with title to land in zoned versus unzoned localities, we obtain a ratio of 1.06. In other words, the ratio of homeowners without title relative to those with title is slightly higher in zoned versus unzoned localities. On the other hand, zoned localities have slightly less in-migration, so that the share of migrants to residents in zoned versus unzoned localities is 0.97. These numbers suggest tougher zoning is associated with both reduced overall growth and increased informal sector development. Presumably, the adoption of tougher zoning is endogenous. Those with tougher zoning may have faced potentially higher growth, and therefore imposed tougher regulations to curtail it. The general issue of endogeneity will be critical in the later identi…cation of the e¤ects of servicing on locality growth.
Conceptualizing Exclusionary Behavior
This section develops a model upon which to base the key aspects of the empirical formulations of strategic behavior, servicing levels, and population growth. Since the empirical work is focused on variations across localities within urban areas for identi…cation of e¤ects, we are not going to focus on the determination of urban area characteristics. For example, we assume workers in all localities in an urban area participate in the same overall urban area labor market. Then, conditional on total urban area size, people's choice of locality within an urban area does not a¤ect their wage incomes (although in the empirics we experimented with allowing the choice to a¤ect disposable incomes through commuting cost di¤erences).
We formulate the basic problem much like the welfare competition literature in the United States (Wildasin 1991 , Brueckner 2000 , where within a region, localities are choosing policies in the face of a potential in ‡ux of migrants. In our case, the policy is the servicing of small houses typically occupied by migrants. The urban area faces a supply of in-migrants, which will be split across the localities of the urban area depending on the living conditions in these localities. Incumbent residents of localities value better services for these migrants for either altruistic or externality reasons, which is a force to increase service levels. However, they prefer fewer migrants to their own locality, which is a force to reduce service levels. For economic growth reasons, incumbent residents of a locality may want more migrants overall to the urban area as long as these migrants do not live in their own locality. We start by specifying the preferences and demand functions of migrants depending on whether they are serviced or not. Then we look at equilibrium in the locality housing market and equilibrium in the ‡ow of migrants to the urban area, as well as the distribution of migrants across localities. Based on this information, on the service levels in other localities, and on the characteristics of the own locality's incumbent-resident population, each locality strategically chooses a level of servicing.
Migrants have preferences of the form
where x is the numeraire good, h is housing, g is the quantity of urban services such as water, and b is the share of migrants who are serviced, a positive externality for both migrants and incumbent residents. The share of migrants served is a policy variable chosen by the locality. The endogenous number of migrants to the locality is L. All migrants are assumed to live in the informal housing sector while incumbent residents live in the formal sector. Based on policy decisions of the locality, some migrants live in neighborhoods where the locality publicly provides piped water at a unit cost c 0 (e.g., the cost of metered water). Other migrants live in unserviced neighborhoods, where they must privately secure services at a higher unit cost, c (e.g., water purchased from water delivery trucks).
Equilibrium within the Informal Sector
Migrants residing in serviced neighborhoods have housing demand functions and quasiindirect utility functions of the form
Disposable income of migrants is y and p 0 is the price of housing in serviced neighborhoods. Those residing in unserviced neighborhoods have demand functions for housing and an indirect utility of the form
For the same housing price p, U 0 > U , given c > c 0 . To equilibrate utility across the two types of neighborhoods within a locality, p 0 > p , and from equation (2b) and (3b), we have
Equation (4) underlies the hedonic regressions reported in Appendix A for Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, examining within locality di¤erences in relative rents based on type of service.
Across communities, overall di¤erences in servicing and other conditions will be re ‡ected in absolute price di¤erences in both p 0 and p. Migration to a locality is governed by two equilibrium conditions: demand equals supply in the locality housing market and utility must be equal for all migrants across localities within the urban area.
Housing Demand Equals Supply
For the condition of housing demand equaling housing supply, we assume housing supply for migrants to the informal sector of a locality is given by H s (A; p) where A describes supply conditions in the locality, based upon vacant land availability and the cost of bringing extra land into production of housing services. The number of serviced sites in the informal sector is a policy choice of existing residents, so the supply margin is the unserviced sector with price p. Hence the supply speci…cation H s (A; p). Summing the individual housing demands of the L 0 serviced people from equation (2a) and of the L L 0 unserviced people from (3a), and using equation (4) for p 0 , we have
In equation (5b), b L 0 =L is the proportion of migrants served, which is the basic policy variable.
Supply of Migrants
The …nal piece for internal locality equilibrium in markets for migrants concerns the supply of migrants to the locality. Localities within an urban area share migrants, whose total supply is increasing in utility o¤ered at the margin in the urban area and hence at the margin for all localities in the urban area (given equalized utility for migrants across the urban area). Utility needs to rise as the total number of migrants L to the urban area increases, with an inverse supply function of the form f (L); f 0 > 0. Equating utility of the marginal unserviced migrant in our locality, U = U (y; p; c; b), to this inverse supply, we can solve for the locality housing price-level to get p = p(L; y; c; b).
Substituting for p from equation (6) into (5a), we get L = L(b; A; L; y; c 0 ; c).
Using urban area …xed e¤ects (conditioning on L), we will estimate a version of equation (7) to show how the "policy" instrument, b, as well as housing supply conditions, A, a¤ect locality population. Although service-level di¤erences within localities are capitalized into intra-community di¤erences in housing prices, locality choice by migrants is a¤ected by relative service levels because service levels are an externality. Thus, relative servicing is a policy instrument for localities to encourage or discourage in-migration. We also note that they a¤ect overall housing demand and hence price level within the locality via capitalization and the proportions of serviced versus unserviced housing (p 0 and b versus p and (1 b) on the left-hand side of equation (5a)).
Equilibrium across Localities within an Urban Area
We now turn to the urban area as a whole in which there are di¤erent localities, indexed 1, 2, 3, and so on. We have an equation (7) for each locality, noting that, for urban area j,
L i , where i indexes localities. Given the de…nition of L j and an equation (7) for each locality within the urban area, in principle we can solve for a system of equations for each locality where
n j is the number of localities in urban area j, b j is the vector of service ratios of localities in urban area j; and A j is the vector of land supply endowments for migrants in each locality in urban area j. Income levels and costs of publicly provided services are indexed by j to indicate they vary by urban area. Unit costs of services could vary by localities within an urban area, in which case we have vectors, c 0j and c j . Finally, the function is also indexed since its form will vary with the number of localities, n j . Given L ij ( ) functions, we can calculate the population response of any locality in an urban area to a change in another locality's policy variable, b ij . Thus, if we are looking at locality 1, we can calculate @L ij =@b 1j for all i 2 j, which is essential to assessing strategic responses.
The Strategic Choice of Servicing for Migrants
Existing local residents of locality 1 of a representative urban area choose b 1 to maximize utility. We use a reduced-form speci…cation of preferences,
For the …rst argument, we allow more migrants, L, to the overall urban area to increase incomes of existing urban area residents, y(L). This could re ‡ect scale e¤ects in urban area total employment and/or the labor substitution e¤ects in production where more lowskilled migrants raise the productivity of existing high-skilled residents. It is also meant to capture any urban area level diseconomies, such as generalized congestion on intra-urban area highways from having more workers in the urban area, although urban area scale e¤ects in net here are modeled as positive. For migrants, we ignore these scale economies, although they are easy to add back in. The second term, where V b 1 > 0, re ‡ects positive externalities from better servicing of migrants in the locality. However, the third term, where V L 1 < 0, implies that while residents of locality 1 want migrants to the urban area, they do not want them in their own locality. This could re ‡ect local congestion considerations or simple prejudices against migrants. Z 1 are other characteristics of the locality, such as income of existing residents. Existing residents choose b 1 to maximize equation (9), holding other localities'choices of service levels …xed (the Nash assumption), accounting for how the choice of b 1 a¤ects other localities'migrants. Maximization gives
where the @L ij =@b 1 's are calculated from equation (8). Using this …rst order condition and an equation (8) for each locality in the urban area, we can de…ne
where b 1j is the vector of service levels in other localities in the urban area. Equation (11) will be the basis for estimating strategic interactions and how characteristics of existing localities in ‡uence policy choices. For strategic interactions, by di¤erentiating equation (11), we can solve for db 1i =db ij , or how locality 1 changes its service levels in response to a di¤erent service o¤ering in locality i. This gives a test of strategic interactions. But of greater interest empirically, as suggested in Figures 1b and 2 , will be how di¤erent localities strategize according to whether they are higher-income versus lower-income or larger versus smaller.
Extensions
So far we have looked at migrants assuming they are generally low-skilled, and we have assumed existing residents are high-skilled and immobile. In actuality, we may also have in-migration of high-skilled individuals from outside the urban area as well as movements of existing high-and low-skilled residents across localities. While we will estimate overall locality household growth equations based on equation (7), we will also separately estimate growth equations for high-skilled and low-skilled households. We introduce other considerations, such as di¤ering tastes across localities among existing residents concerned with inequitable provision of public services, as re ‡ected by their voting preferences. Note the general speci…cation of preferences of existing residents could incorporate the idea that migrants may be a …scal burden or asset to existing residents of a locality.
E¤ect of Service Provision on Locality Growth and Population Composition
What is the e¤ect of servicing decisions on locality population growth? The speci…cation is based on a linearized version of equation (7) with urban area …xed e¤ects. Controls such as total migrants to the urban area, local servicing standards, and urban area wages are swept into the …xed e¤ect. What we examine is the within urban area allocation of migrants across localities. The basic estimating equation is
We look at local population growth between 1991 and 2000 as a function of locality characteristics in 1991. From equation (7) these include the level of servicing of small houses, b i;t 1 , and a set of covariates, A i;t 1 , which describe housing supply conditions in the locality. A key issue in estimation concerns the error structure. The urban growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1995) often takes the stance that (a) covariates are pre-determined and not a¤ected by contemporaneous shocks that might induce growth, and (b) by looking at a growth equation, we have already di¤erenced out time-invariant variables that a¤ect longrun size. As such, in the literature, one standard approach is to rely on OLS estimation of cross-sectional growth equations. However, it seems likely that there are omitted variables a¤ecting growth that persist over time, so that the " i;t 1 , which a¤ected past growth and the evolution of the predetermined covariates, may be correlated with " i;t . Of greatest concern is the policy variable, b i;t 1 , itself. Service supply today may be a¤ected by past locality servicing, given bottlenecks in capacity expansion. Thus, low supply in 1991 may re ‡ect unmeasured good growth conditions from 1980-1991 for the locality, which caused a back-log in supply, and such growth conditions may persist into the 1990s. That is, high past growth is negatively correlated with current supply of water connections. Such in ‡uences will bias the estimated coe¢ cient downward, understating the positive e¤ects of good servicing on encouraging migration. The same issue relates to housing supply conditions: good unobservables driving locality growth in the past in ‡uence current housing supply conditions.
We focus on locality growth from 1991-2000. This last interval in the census data allows us to separate Brazil's initial rapid industrialization and urbanization that occurs after World War II and extends into the 1980s, from today's modern economy. By 1991, Brazil is 75% urbanized. The axis of industrialization that had focused on Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the Southeast of Brazil expands with substantial and on-going industrialization of hinterland cities and more rapid growth in the Northeast region. The drivers of local growth have changed with the development of new export markets and the development of new agricultural crops for export, as well as the move from heavy industry based on state capitalism to lighter industry based on the manufacture of consumer products (Da Mata et al. 2005 ). This change in economic regimes will be part of an identi…cation strategy. We note that despite the high level of 1991 urbanization, there remains on-going migration, as well as population growth. In our sample, the number of urban households grew by 40% from 1991-2000. We look for growth e¤ects in the democratic era to see if poor servicing in 1991, which arose in the non-democratic 1980s as explored in the next section, a¤ects growth from 1991-2000.
Instruments
We need to instrument for two types of variables. First is the service variable: public water supply to migrant households. Second are housing supply conditions in the locality.
Extent of Servicing
For water supply, we turn to geological and weather variables that a¤ect the e¢ cacy of wells. These geological and weather variables a¤ected historical private water supply through wells used by higher income households and hence the demand historically to invest heavily in central water provision, even without exclusionary considerations. Localities with historically better conditions for wells will o¤er less central water connections today. However, today's migrants without a central connection must obtain water by hauling from stand pipes or purchasing it privately (trucks, bags, bottles). Wells, given their cost and the depletion of water tables, are not an option for migrants and more generally for any low income unserviced households in 1991. Thus, we believe the instruments for servicing meet the exclusion restriction: they are correlated with public servicing levels, but have no direct, independent e¤ect on current household growth rates.
What geological conditions determined the e¢ cacy of wells historically? If underlying sediments and rocks in a locality are more porous, they retain more water and wells are a more viable alternative to a public water connection. Second, insolation a¤ects the rate and variability of underground water replenishment, again a key issue in the viability of wells. Insolation is a measure re ‡ecting the amount and intensity of sunlight reaching the earth's surface. High insolation is associated with less rainfall and more evaporation, impeding ground water replenishment. A high variance over the year in insolation means there are more intense periods of water replenishment without evaporation. While insolation does vary across localities in an urban area, the fraction of the locality area having porous rocks and sediment varies much more. Our key instruments for small houses served with a central water connection are porous geology (reducing the need for servicing, historically), porous geology interacted with mean insolation (increasing the need for servicing), and porous geology interacted with the standard deviation of insolation (reducing the need for servicing). Column 1 in Table B2 contains the …rst-stage regression showing that these are strong instruments for servicing, with the expected e¤ects.
Housing Supply Conditions
The other instruments are for variables relating to housing supply conditions, which, controlling for land, are potentially the number of urban households, average education (in ‡uencing the demand for space), and the share of households that are rural in the locality (in ‡uencing the potential supply of higher density urban housing). The main instrumental variables strategy is based on two notions. First, unobservables that a¤ected urban area and locality growth in the past are di¤erent from unobservables a¤ecting growth today, so error drawings from 1970 are uncorrelated with drawings in the 1990s. As discussed previously, within urban areas, locality economic bases have changed (an unobservable not captured in equation (7)), as has the urban area labor market demand for the skill sets of households living in di¤erent localities. In addition, with economic development, there has been decentralization of economic activity within urban areas as well as to hinterland cities. The second notion is that past drawings a¤ected housing and other irreversible investment decisions as well as locality population educational composition in the past. Historical accumulations are relevant since any adjustments away from them in locality characteristics are slow, so historical variables are strong instruments for 1991 covariates. If, in the 1960s, a locality attracted low-educated migrants who settled in dense neighborhoods in the locality, that in‡uences current educational composition even if locality economic conditions have changed completely. Clearly, many of the instruments do not come directly from the model we presented, which has no dynamics, although it has one irreversibility (initial resident population). Rather, they come from a much richer version of such a model, that allows for costly adjustments in residential markets within and across localities, limited reversability of types of housing and initial di¤erences in stocks of high versus low income residents, and much more detail on locality versus urban area labor markets.
Use of historical instruments presents some complications. There is a tension between going further back in time to break the persistence in relevant unobservables and weakening the strength of the instruments. Apart from speci…cation tests, it is di¢ cult to prove that the assumptions are correct-i.e., this is at best a very limited version of a natural experiment. In our work, it was clear that instruments from 1970 gave much better speci…cation test results for the 1991-2000 period, compared to the 1980-1991 time period, one reason why we focus on the latter time period for population growth equations. For instruments, we include the following variables either on their own or interacted with other instruments: (1) access of a locality to Sao Paulo markets, which played a critical role historically, before the development of modern trans-national transportation systems even though today it has little impact on growth; 9 (2) the illiteracy rate among the adult population in the locality and the rest of the urban area in 1970, which in ‡uences, through accumulation, the average educational attainment today; (3) the manufacturing-to-service employment ratio in the rest of the urban area in 1970, which helped urban area economic attainment at the time and in ‡uences local economic composition today; (5) the number of households in the rest of the urban area, which gives a historical size measure in ‡uencing urban size today; and (6) the share of the rest of the locality households that were rural in 1970 and would be a basis for urban growth and later size. Note the attempt to generally rely on characteristics of localities in the rest of the urban area-i.e., in localities other than the own locality-in order to mitigate problems of persistence of own locality unobservables. 
E¤ects of Servicing on Growth of Urban Households

Servicing
In OLS estimation, the coe¢ cient on servicing is strongly negative and signi…cant, re ‡ecting the anticipated bias. Localities subject to the strong growth shocks of the late 1980s have poor servicing, potentially because of capacity expansion problems and past strategic choices. Instrumental variables estimation takes this strongly negative coe¢ cient and reverses its sign, making it positive. This positive coe¢ cient is large. For a point estimate of 0.74, a one standard deviation (0.21) increase in servicing leads to an increase of 0.16, or approximately one standard deviation, in the growth rate in the number of households (for which the mean is 0.40) during the decade. This is a basic result of the paper: poor servicing of small houses likely to be occupied by low-income and low-educated migrants has strong negative locality growth e¤ects. Withholding water supply in order to strategically retard locality growth below what it would have been in the absence of such choices is e¤ective. However, the coe¢ cient is somewhat noisily estimated, always signi…cant at the 10% level but not quite at the 5% level (noting error terms are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the urban area level). The partial F -statistic on the …rst-stage regression for service levels is around 13 and the p-value for the Anderson Likelihood Ratio test statistic is 0.11, suggesting we cannot reject "weak identi…cation." We are instrumenting for multiple interrelated variables under urban area …xed e¤ects, limiting the overall power of the instruments. LIML estimators are more robust to weak instruments than 2SLS but are more sensitive to the length of the instrument list. We obtain larger estimates signi…cant at the 5% level when estimating with LIML and with the original instrument list, and we obtain similar estimates to the 2SLS results from column 3 of Table 3 when estimating with LIML and a shortened instrument list. 10 The 2SLS results from Table 3 may be more conservative 10 Estimating column 3 of Table 3 using LIML instead of 2SLS, we obtain estimates for the coe¢ cient (standard error) on the servicing variable of 1.261 (0.648). When estimating column 3 of Table 3 using LIML and a shortened instrument list, we obtain estimates of 0.858 (0.506). The shortened instrument list is adult illiteracy in 1970, share of the locality population that voted against the military in the 1982 legislative elections, the manufacturing-to-service employment ratio in the rest of the urban area in 1970, estimates of the e¤ect of servicing on the growth of urban households in a locality.
We perform two sets of robustness checks for the growth equation. First, we reestimate the model in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 , separately dropping (a) all 89 localities in which there are multiple municipalities, (b) the 44 localities in which there are multiple municipalities where the dominant municipality has less than 85% of the locality urban population, and (c) all localities in the two largest urban areas, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The estimates do not change signi…cantly, so the inclusion of these localities has no impact on results. Second, as a service variable, we tried the share of houses without land title that have a central water connection, but our instruments are very weak. While the coe¢ cient on servicing is consistent with the Table 3 result, it has a large standard error. 
Housing Supply Conditions
In Table 3 , the basic controls on housing supply are land area and the number of householdscontrols for density of overall development. Again, the biases in moving from OLS to 2SLS estimation are what we expect. A high number of households is associated with recent strong local shocks and on-going growth, understating the negative e¤ect of crowding on future housing supply conditions. So, for the number of households (increasing crowding), an OLS coe¢ cient in column 1 of -0.026 becomes -0.112 under 2SLS estimation; and for land (alleviating crowding), the OLS coe¢ cient of 0.006 becomes 0.060 under 2SLS. Additional variables that have e¤ects with OLS estimation, such as education (reducing supply) or share of households that are rural in the locality (increasing supply), have no signi…cant e¤ects when estimating with 2SLS.
Composition E¤ects
So far we have looked at how withholding service leads to a decline in overall in-migration. Because it is aimed at small houses, withholding service also acts to discourage in-migration of lower-income residents from other parts of the urban area as well as of new arrivals to the urban area. Thus, we should see withholding service negatively a¤ecting the growth of this ratio interacted with the log of the distance of the urban area to Sao Paulo, the log of the number of urban households in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of the locality's geology that is porous, this share porous interacted with mean insolation, and this share porous interacted with the standard deviation of insolation. When estimating with LIML and the shortened instrument list, the p-value for the Anderson Likelihood ratio test statistic is 0.03, suggesting we can reject weak identi…cation.
11 The best case involves the short instrument list used in the LIML speci…cation (see previous footnote), where the …rst-stage partial F -statistic for the service variable is 6.20 and the p-value on the Anderson Likelihood Ratio test statistic is 0.63. For this speci…cation, the OLS coe¢ cient of -0.164 becomes 1.821 under LIML but the standard error is 2.215. lower-income households in a locality, which we represent by education level of the household head. We use education rather than income to better represent permanent socioeconomic status.
We de…ne two groups: households where the household head has not completed primary school, which is about one-third of the urban population in our sample of localities in 2000, and those who have primary school or more. While we expect that poor servicing of small houses will a¤ect the growth of low-education households in a locality, there is the possibility it will also detract from the growth of higher-education households. In the modeling in equation (9), we postulate that servicing of migrants is a positive externality for incumbent residents. Thus, we examine separately the e¤ect of servicing small houses on the growth in the number of lower-education and higher-education households.
The basic speci…cations are in Table 4 . For housing supply, we control for base period overall density and household count of the relevant group whose growth we are investigating. Columns 1 and 2 deal with lower-education household growth, using both OLS and 2SLS estimation, and columns 3 and 4 deal with higher-education household growth, again using OLS and 2SLS estimation. The deterrent e¤ects of higher density and own group size are strengthened in moving from OLS to 2SLS, as expected, although the coe¢ cients are not always signi…cant.
For the e¤ect of servicing small houses on the growth in the number of lower-education and higher-education households, as expected, and as in the overall growth estimation, OLS coe¢ cients on the servicing of small houses are negative. With 2SLS estimation, the service coe¢ cient for the growth of low-education households becomes positive, very large, and signi…cant. A one standard deviation increase in servicing (0.21) increases the growth of low-education households by 0.15 under 2SLS estimation. For high-education households between 1991 and 2000, under 2SLS estimation, the coe¢ cient for servicing of small houses is also large, positive, and almost the same in magnitude as for low-education households. The estimate is much noisier, however, and not signi…cant.
As robustness checks, for higher-education households, we include a control for the servicing of large houses occupied by high-education households (not shown), which leaves other results unchanged and yields an insigni…cant coe¢ cient on the large-house variable. When we estimate a ratio model (also not shown), where the ratio is the growth rate of low-education relative to high-education households, 12 the coe¢ cient on servicing of small 12 This ratio represents a form of di¤erencing and has the advantage of removing location observables and unobservables whose e¤ects are common to both low-education and high-education groups. Letting N k , k 2 fL; Hg, be the number of households that are low-education (L) or high-education (H), b be the share of small houses connected to water, and be any di¤erential in slope coe¢ cient between low-and high-education households'response to the share of small houses serviced, the estimating equation is then:
houses is negative and not statistically di¤erent from zero (the coe¢ cient is -0.402, with standard error 0.338). Both the results from the ratio model and the results in columns 2 and 4 suggest that poor servicing of small houses has adverse e¤ects on the growth of all education households, suggesting a negative externality for higher-education households.
Determinants of Locality Infrastructure Servicing and Land-Use Regulation
In this section we examine how localities choose service levels, strategically reacting to other localities'choices of service levels, focusing on the implementation of equation (11). Before doing so, we note that the local public …nance literature and the industrial organization (IO) literature have diverged on how to approach strategic interactions. The IO literature has moved away from directly estimating strategic interactions to estimating structural parameters of the relevant cost and demand equations, from which to calculate strategic interactions. In local public …nance context with the type of model we have outlined, there are two problems in following the IO approach. First, our model does not rely on a simple cost and demand function. There are many more moving parts or functions to specify and identify structurally: a supply of migrants mediated through housing markets and public service conditions, and then preferences of incumbent residents for migrants and their service levels, taking externalities into account. Results therefore depend even more on functional assumptions. Second, our characterization of decision making on service levels for migrants is itself a simpli…ed reduced form speci…cation, which avoids the complexities of what the true underlying structure must have been in Brazilian localities in the 1980s. For these two reasons, we follow the local public …nance literature in looking at growth and strategic interactions directly (e.g., Case et al. 1993 , Besley & Case 1995 , in a reduced form context.
The local public …nance approach nevertheless poses two problems. The …rst (which would be the IO critique) is that we can only identify strategic interactions "locally,"in the sense that the literature uses linearized speci…cations to estimate equation (11). Even the most simpli…ed speci…cation of primitives does not yield a linear form, and in typical functional speci…cations of tastes and technology, the relationships governing b 1 will be highly non-linear. Second, across urban areas, there are di¤erent numbers of localities; this generates di¤erent forms to the b 1 equation, an issue ignored in the local public …nance literature and one that does not exist in the IO literature with just one market. When there are many localities in large urban areas, we should have dampened strategic interactions as we move towards perfect competition. We examine this issue below.
The local public …nance speci…cation to reaction functions is to decide that, for locality 1, some localities are in more direct competition than others, and rather than explore heterogeneous responses to other localities, other localities are represented by an index in a simple linear speci…cation. The standard formulation as reviewed in Brueckner (2000) is
where P i6 =1; i2j w 1i b i is a weighted sum of all other localities'choices in urban area j. Writing equation (13) for all localities, we have
where W is the weighting matrix, with zeros for the own locality and for all other localities not in the same urban area as the own locality. Weights for localities in the same urban area are normalized to sum to 1. Weights are typically chosen based on no explicit model. However, since equation (11) contains land supply, a measure of a locality's capacity to absorb new migrant households, we experiment with weighting by a land supply measure so that weights on other localities' servicing variables, b i for i 6 = 1 and i 2 j, increases with land supply, A i . We use the inverse of population density for each locality as a weight indicating greater availability of land supply. In the literature (e.g., Case et al. 1993 , Besley & Case 1995 , most weighting is based on spatial or economic proximity, in our case within an urban area, which is outside the speci…ed model, although the intuition for proximity weighting is that a locality is in more direct competition with near neighbors. We utilize land-supply weights since they arise in the model, 13 but also discuss results using proximity weights and equal weights within the urban area. The intuition for land-supply weights is that we believe localities are in greater competition, and therefore place more weight, on other localities that have greater available land with which to accommodate new migrant households.
13 To see how land-supply weights arise from the model, assume the following functional forms: preferences of migrants to locality i are x + g + b i , supply of migrants to the urban area is denoted by L, land supply is p i = L i A 1 i , and preferences of existing residents of locality i are denoted by C i + b i Z i L i . In a two locality urban area, i 2 (1; 2), these speci…cations yield the following reaction function:
where C i and B i are locality-speci…c constants and other variables are as de…ned in Section 3. Note the weighting of b 2 by land supply in locality 2.
There are several issues in the estimation of equation (13) w 1i b i are too weak to support that approach here.
A third solution for the endogeneity of each locality's b 1 is to rewrite equation (13a) as
and estimate by maximum likelihood. The problem in estimating equation (14) is that it ignores spatial correlation of the error terms, which could arise, for example, from unobserved, correlated geographic factors across localities within an urban area that a¤ect public infrastructure choices. Ignoring this fact in a speci…cation like equation (14) would lead to biased estimates. Thus, we assume an error structure of the form " = M" + , where N (0; 2 I) and M is a matrix of spatial weights. For this speci…cation, the estimating model becomes
For the M matrix, we use weights calculated from the inverse distance between pairs of localities in an urban area (normalized to sum to one), which gives greater weight to neighboring localities with similar geography. Given that urban area …xed e¤ects are included in Z, it is not clear what the sign of should be. For Z, we use lagged covariates to deal with issues of contemporaneous correlation between errors and covariates; however, policy choices, b, are contemporaneous. In our case, maximum likelihood estimates of equation (15) are almost identical to the OLS estimates using lagged covariates (including lagged P i6 =1; i2j
with some degree of comfort, we will estimate versions of equation (13) that allow for more sophisticated strategic interactions than permitted by the linearization upon which equation (15) is based.
Results
We examine the determination of service levels for small houses in 1991, just after democratization, presuming they re ‡ect policy decisions made in the 1980s under dictatorship. We assume locality elites in the 1980s have the ability to manipulate servicing of neighborhoods to encourage or discourage in-migration. We estimate di¤erent speci…cations of the model, starting with a base case where we try to determine a reasonably robust econometric speci…cation, and we explore counterfactuals. Then we look at more sophisticated strategic interactions.
Base Case
To look at econometric speci…cations, we start with a base case in Table 5 . Locality characteristics (the Z variables) are median household income, number of urban households, and the interaction between the two, with variables in logarithmic form. For strategic interactions, we use inverse density weights in summing opponent localities'strategic choices of service levels (the b variables) within the urban area, as suggested by the model. We also report on other weighting schemes. Column 1 gives OLS estimates of equation (13), where own locality 1991 service levels react to opponents'1980 service levels and to 1980 locality characteristics. Column 4 repeats the column 1 estimation except it uses all 1991 covariates. Column 2 provides results from the estimation by maximum likelihood of equation (15).
14 The estimation for column 2 uses own and opponents'1991 service levels, given that equation (15) in principle solves the endogeneity problem of opponents' contemporaneous service choices. To mitigate other endogeneity issues and facilitate comparison, we also use 1980 covariates and inverse density weights for the column 2 estimation. These inverse density weights apply to the W matrix, although we experiment with alternatives. The M matrix uses inverse distance weights between pairs of localities within the urban area as would be suggested by notions of spatial correlation. All speci…cations include urban area …xed e¤ects.
Strategic Interactions
We start with an analysis of strategic interactions and estimates of the coe¢ cient on the servicing variable, b. In the base linear model, all estimates of strategic interactions are negative and signi…cant. The interpretation is that a rise in servicing in one locality leads other localities to withhold their servicing. The rise elsewhere helps attract more migrants to the urban area as desired for scale economy reasons and allows one's own locality to withhold servicing in order to de ‡ect incoming migrants to other localities in the urban area. For the magnitude of strategic interactions, the OLS estimate in Table 5 , column 1 is -0.442. The corresponding OLS estimate in column 4, where we use contemporaneous values for other localities' servicing levels, shows the hypothesized direction of bias from using contemporaneous measures. The coe¢ cient vastly overstates the absolute magnitude of strategic interactions. In column 2, the MLE estimate of is similar to the OLS estimate, but is absolutely larger at -0.542. We estimated many versions of the OLS and MLE models in columns 1 and 2, in particular varying the weighting scheme for the W matrix. Using equal weights within urban areas increases the absolute value of the coe¢ cient to -0.679 under OLS and -0.590 under MLE, with both results being highly signi…cant. Using inverse distance weights for the W matrix yields an insigni…cant negative value for under both OLS and MLE, however, for MLE there is the usual problem of robustness and precision when using the same weighting scheme for both the W and M matrices. Given that OLS and MLE results are sensitive to the choice of W weights, we rely on the inverse density ones suggested by the model. The estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the weighted share of small houses serviced in other localities leads the own locality to increasingly withhold service to new households, implying a reduction in the share of small houses served by about 0.442 percentage points.
Column 2 results have some particular features. First, the spatial correlation measure for error terms, , is negative, which may seem surprising, but recall we have urban area …xed e¤ects. If urban area …xed e¤ects are removed, the spatial correlation in errors becomes strongly positive. Second, estimates of are statistically weak. Third, the standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates in column 2 are less than in column 1, where column 1 allows for within urban area clustering, while column 2 speci…es a common form to within urban area spatial correlation. Finally, in comparing column 1 and 2 results, as we will discuss later, the marginal e¤ects of non-strategic interaction variables (the Z variables) are very close to each other. The results suggest that the OLS estimates in column 1 with lagged covariates are a reasonable approximation for relevant MLE estimates. Since we want to allow for more economically interesting strategic interactions than modelled in equation (15), we will tend to rely on OLS estimation with lagged covariates. This choice is enforced by the notion that MLE estimates are criticized in the literature as non-robust to increased complexity (e.g.,
Conley 2008).
Socioeconomic E¤ects Apart from strategic interactions, we want to know how locality socioeconomic conditions a¤ect policy choices. We believe service provision in general is a normal good whose levels will rise with median locality income. The urban literature hypothesizes that there are scale economies in public service provision which would lead larger localities to provide services more cheaply, although such scale e¤ects may disappear at modest sizes. However, we also anticipate that larger, richer localities may have more incentives to de ‡ect migrants. First, they may have a stronger aversion to congestion or increased population density. Second, richer households may not want the children of lowincome and low-educated migrants in local schools. Lastly, there may be …scal reasons for richer localities to want to de ‡ect low-income migrants, such as the dilution of any property tax base. While we might expect positive income and scale (in terms of public service provision) e¤ects, we expect the interaction between these two to be negative. All columns in Table 5 show positive income and scale e¤ects, with a negative interaction term, as hypothesized.
What do the results in Table 5 suggest about locality preferences toward the servicing of houses potentially occupied by low-income and low-educated migrants? Based on column 1 of Table 5 , coe¢ cients indicate that for localities at one standard deviation below mean income (at 9.13), a two standard deviation increase in size (2.82) increases servicing by about 0.08 or eight percentage points, while at one standard deviation above mean income (at 9.91), the same increase in size leads to a scale e¤ect that is about six percentage points smaller (an increase in servicing of 0.02).
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Similarly, at one standard deviation below mean size (at 8.25), a two standard deviation increase in income (0.78) increases servicing by 0.16 or 16 percentage points, while at one standard deviation above mean size (10.25), the same increase in income leads to an income e¤ect that is about 25% smaller (an increase in servicing of 0.12). Table 6 explores the negative income-scale interaction further. Based on the Table 5 , column 1 speci…cation, we divide localities into separate size and income quintiles and then interact these, creating 24 cells relative to the base. As Table 6 shows, both income and scale e¤ects increase monotonically across quintiles. All interactive e¤ects are statistically insigni…cant and not reported in the table except for the highest income quintile in the fourth and …fth size quintiles. These interactive e¤ects are large and signi…cant, strongly diminishing the scale and income e¤ects. Moving from the lowest income and size quintiles to the highest, ignoring interaction, raises servicing by 0.47 (47 percentage points); the interaction reduces that increase by 0.18. Table 5 , column 3, we add covariates in ‡uencing locality choices. One represents "preferences"for more egalitarian policies, taken as the share of voting in the locality in favor of anti-military political parties in the 1982 elections for representatives to the national legislature. This is intended to be a measure of preferences for more "leftist"representatives who might be more egalitarian (as revealed by actions in the subsequent democratic era). This indeed is associated with increased servicing of small houses. Higher own locality density also appears to increase servicing, which is intuitive since greater density would entail stronger negative externalities from poor water and sanitation conditions. These additional variables have little impact on the marginal e¤ects of other covariates, and we do not carry them through in other speci…cations.
Finally in
Robustness and Counterfactuals
While the vast majority of our localities are stand-alone municipalities, some are combinations of these political units. Of those localities that are multi-municipality combinations, about half have over 85% of their urban population in one dominant municipality. We reestimate the basic models in Table 5 dropping localities that are not stand-alone municipalities and dropping localities where the dominant municipality has less than 85% of the urban locality population. We also reestimate the basic models dropping all localities in the two largest urban areas, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In all cases, there is almost no change in the coe¢ cients, although we lose statistical power because of smaller sample sizes.
For counterfactuals, if we are correct about the nature of incentives to de ‡ect low-income migrants, then we should not observe the relationships in Table 5 in one alternative situation, and they may be more muted in a second. For the …rst, we would not expect the same demand and exclusionary motivations to operate in the servicing of large houses, which do not cater to low-income migrants, if we presume that localities have less or no desire to de ‡ect the rich. For the second, with democratization, the national government embarked on a wide-spread policy to upgrade urban slums and their servicing. Thus by 2000, we may see less evidence of localities withholding service to small houses.
As columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show, there are no income and scale interactions in the servicing of large houses in 1991 and also none for small houses in 2000, based on the OLS formulation of Table 5 , column 1. Although not in the table, for the MLE formulation corresponding to column 2 of Table 5 and for the quintile formulation corresponding to Table  6 , income and size e¤ects and their negative interactions are insigni…cant when looking at both large houses in 1991 and at small houses in 2000. Thus, the expected demand e¤ects for servicing of migrant housing by existing residents that we found in Table 5 disappear in these two situations.
However, as columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show, and as we also …nd in the MLE formulation, there is evidence of muted strategic interactions between localities in the servicing of large houses in 1991 and of large strategic interactions in the servicing of small houses in 2000. The strategic interactions in the servicing of large houses in 1991 may be attributed to the high correlation ( = .79) between the servicing of large and small houses within localities. Indeed, if we control for servicing of small houses (in 1980) in column 1, the strategic interaction coe¢ cient in the servicing of large houses becomes insigni…cant. Moreover, given that higher-income households can generally a¤ord private alternatives to public water provision (deep wells, …lters, and water delivery service), an exclusionary strategy could involve indiscriminately withholding service to new houses, which is then prohibitive only for lower-income households.
For the servicing of small houses in 2000 (column 2), strategic interactions remain strong despite the collapse of demand e¤ects. This may suggest that even after national democratization, localities still can act strategically. The e¤ect of democratization may be to even up servicing between richer and poorer and larger and smaller localities, but not to remove strategic decision making.
Locality Policy Setting
The evaluations and the linear model in Table 5 impose three key assumptions. First, strategic interactions are modeled as having the same form, regardless of how many localities there are in each urban area and how many competitors or opponents a locality faces. This is not what economic theory tells us. Second, interactions are "locally" linear. Third, the in ‡uence of the W 0 b variable from equation (13a) does not vary by locality characteristics:
high-income and low-income localities are modeled as reacting to other localities'strategic choices in the same fashion. We now explore an example in the data where we can relax these assumptions. We have 10 urban areas with 2 localities each and 13 with 3. Beyond that, we have a more limited sample of urban areas with speci…c numbers of localities: for example, there are 5 urban areas with 4 localities and there are a number of single urban areas with anywhere from 12 to 34 localities. So we experiment with the 2-3 locality urban area sample. We need a su¢ cient number of urban areas with any speci…c number of localities to distinguish e¤ects by number of actors. Moreover, the interactive terms of strategic choices escalates with the number of actors.
We look at the sample of 23 urban areas that have either 2 or 3 localities. For the base speci…cation, we have just W 0 b from equation (13a) for 2 locality urban areas, since each locality interacts with just one other (and W 0 b is just the other locality's choice). For 3 locality urban areas, we have W 0 b (which will now be a weighted average of the 2 opponents' choices), but we allow the slope coe¢ cient to di¤er since there are more actors. In addition, for 3 locality urban areas, for each locality i, we interact w j b j with w k b k (the weighed average of the remaining localities'choices of servicing) to allow interactive e¤ects. After estimating this speci…cation of strategic interactions, we explore interacting opponents' policy choice variables with own locality characteristics, in particular income, to see if high-income versus low-income localities respond di¤erently to opponents'choices. Results are reported in Table 8 . Column 1 of Table 8 repeats the speci…cation of column 1 in Table 5 . Results are similar, although for the sample of 2-3 locality urban areas, the point estimate for strategic interactions is larger in absolute magnitude and the coe¢ cients on the Z variables, representing locality characteristics, have sharper marginal e¤ects. It is not surprising to …nd stronger interactions in a sample where localities have fewer competitors per urban area, compared the general sample where they are reacting to more localities on average. In column 2, we add the new strategic choice variables. The one allowing 3 locality urban areas to have a di¤erent slope to W 0 b is negative but insigni…cant.
More interestingly, the w j b j w k b k interaction term is strongly negative, indicating that in 3 locality urban areas, localities respond to the interaction of opponents' choices. If both opponents raise their servicing levels, which helps attract more migrants to the urban area, that allows the own locality to de ‡ect migrants to these opponent localities by further withholding service. Column 3 then interacts both the W 0 b and the w j b j w k b k terms with locality income.
The coe¢ cient on W 0 b ln(median HH income) is 0.636, suggesting that as localities become richer, their negative strategic reactions to other localities'servicing becomes muted. That is, if one locality increases servicing, a richer locality withholds servicing to new houses (to try to de ‡ect migrants) by less than a poorer locality would. However, the coe¢ cient on w j b j w k b k ln(median HH income) is -0.566, suggesting that the negative reaction to enhanced servicing of both opponents grows as income rises. Overall, as income increases, the net e¤ect appears to be dampened responses to opponents'servicing. If we set w j b j to a typical value (w j = 1/2; b j = 0.74), then the marginal response of b i to a change in w k b k is approximately -5.436+0.427 ln(median HH income). In general, richer localities have a more muted reaction to other localities'choices of servicing.
Conclusions
The extensive literature on the exclusionary policies of local jurisdictions (see Epple & Nechyba 2004 , Gyourko et al. 2006 tends to focus on the exclusionary policies of localities in developed economies where informal housing markets do not exist. We have attempted, in our work, to examine exclusionary policies in a developing country framework where informal markets not only exist but are relatively prevalent, and thus provide an alternative to formal housing markets when localities attempt to enact exclusionary housing restrictions. In such a scenario, whatever legal housing restrictions are in place, migrants can still enter the informal housing market. Beyond enacting legal housing development restrictions, localities can withhold public infrastructure services to the informal housing sector and thereby create a disincentive for migrants to enter. We have examined these migration and exclusion dynamics using a sample of 327 localities in 54 urban areas in Brazil between 1980 and 2000. Migrants move to these urban areas for employment and choose the localities in which they will live. However, certain localities may seek to limit in-migration, especially when migrants are low-income and low-educated. We focus on the provision of public water connections to small (1-3 room) houses in which low-income and low-educated migrants are most likely to live. We estimate the e¤ect of withholding public water connections to small houses on the growth in the number of households in the locality and …nd that not servicing small houses is e¤ective in reducing growth. Not only does withholding service from small houses reduce the growth rate of low-education households, it also reduces the growth rate of high-education households. We attribute this reduced growth e¤ect on high-education households to externalities of living near unserviced areas.
We then estimate the determinants of water provision to small houses. We …nd that richer localities provide more servicing (a wealth e¤ect), larger localities provide more servicing (a scale e¤ect), but being both rich and large is associated with reduced servicing. We also …nd that localities determine their servicing of small houses in response to other localities in the urban area. If other localities increase their servicing, the own locality responds by withholding service to new houses in order to de ‡ect incoming migrants to the other localities. These strategic interactions among localities within an urban area become more muted as localities become richer. Richer localities react less to other localities' policy choices than do poorer localities.
In sum, this paper provides evidence of strategic exclusion as an explanation for the existence of unserviced housing sectors (slums) in localities that have su¢ cient wealth and scale to provide basic infrastructure services to all houses in their jurisdiction. This strategic exclusion reduces locality population growth. De ‡ecting low-income and low-education households by making living conditions for them unpleasant also de ‡ects high-income and high-education households. Localities do not set policies in isolation, but instead react to the policy choices of other localities in their urban area. Richer localities appear to be "policy leaders," setting servicing levels based more on their own characteristics, whereas poorer localities appear to be "policy followers," setting service levels based more on reactions to the service levels of other localities in the urban area. Instruments are: locality adult illiteracy rate in 1970, adult illiteracy rate in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of locality votes for anti-military parties in the 1982 national legislative elections, the manufacturing-to-service employment ratio in the rest of the urban area in 1970, this manufacturingto-service ratio interacted with the log of the distance of the locality to Sao Paulo, the adult illiteracy rate in the rest of the urban area in 1970 interacted with the log of the distance to Sao Paulo, the log number of households in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of households that are rural in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of a locality's land that is composed of porous geology, mean annual insolation in the locality, the standard deviation of average monthly insolation in the locality, the share of a locality's geology that is porous interacted with mean insolation, and the share porous geology interacted with the standard deviation of insolation. Robust standard errors clustered at the urban area level. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% Instruments are: locality adult illiteracy rate in 1970, adult illiteracy rate in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of locality votes for anti-military parties in the 1982 national legislative elections, the manufacturing-to-service employment ratio in the rest of the urban area in 1970, this manufacturingto-service ratio interacted with the log of the distance of the locality to Sao Paulo, the adult illiteracy rate in the rest of the urban area in 1970 interacted with the log of the distance to Sao Paulo, the log number of households in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of households that are rural in the rest of the urban area in 1970, the share of a locality's land that is composed of porous geology, mean annual insolation in the locality, the standard deviation of average monthly insolation in the locality, the share of a locality's geology that is porous interacted with mean insolation, and the share porous geology interacted with the standard deviation of insolation. Robust standard errors clustered at the urban area level. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% Robust standard errors clustered at the urban area level. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% UA with 3 localities * Weighted avg of other localities' service provision OLS with inverse density weighted reaction functions. Robust standard errors clustered at the urban area level. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% 
Appendix A: Rent Hedonics
Hedonic regressions to determine "shadow prices" or consumer willingness-to-pay for attributes apply to speci…c markets. Each locality has its own housing market, so in principle rent regressions to obtain consumer willingness-to-pay for housing and neighborhood attributes should be estimated separately for each locality. We look at Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro municipalities in 1980. We do not have data on prices of owner occupied units, but we do have price data on rental units, most of which are single family housing (rather than apartments). In the hedonic equations, we control for a variety of basic house characteristics: number of bedrooms, number of other rooms, urban versus rural location in the municipality, six types of wall construction materials, seven types of ‡oors, eight types of roofs, and whether the unit is a single family residence. We then control for a variety of servicing features. The identi…cation issue in estimation is that there may be unobserved neighborhood attributes that are correlated with servicing or even house attributes. To minimize this problem, we insert district level …xed e¤ects, where Sao Paulo has 56 and Rio de Janeiro has 24 districts. The most recent year for which we can do this is 1980; later years either do not have rent data or do not have district identi…ers. For services, we do a full examination of all types and forms of services on columns 1 and 3 of Table A1 and then a reduced form in columns 2 and 4 where we use the typical summary measures: central water connection and full service (any electricity, central sewer, and connection to central piped water). Table A1 shows the basic results.
In Table A1 , the reported coe¢ cients re ‡ect the percent by which rents rise. From columns 1 and 3, it is clear that in both Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, there is a high premium on having central water piped into the house, substantially more than well water piped into the house, presumably re ‡ecting the greater reliability of supply. Electricity garners a very large premium, even more so if it is metered (legal), indicating both reliable supply and higher (amperage) e¤ective service. Public garbage collection has modest or no impacts. Central sewer is much more valued than septic systems, especially in Rio de Janeiro. Septic systems only raise premiums modestly above having no service, presumably re ‡ecting the failure of septic systems in these dense localities. Clearly, there could be neighborhood conditions that vary within districts of these central cities that are correlated with covariates, but the results are suggestive. Robust standard errors clustered at the urban area level. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1%
